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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

SYNOPSIS OF SOME OF THE LEADING CASES DECIDED BY
THE KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS DURING
THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1913.

In case of Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company vs. Gatewood,
appealed from the Franklin Circuit Court, the question involvel,
was, as to the right of a railroal company to refuse to admit a passenger to its cars who is in an intoxicated condition. The law
authorizing the company to refuse the admission of a passenger is
set forth in the suggested instruction made by the court in the -eversal of this case and remanding it to the lower court for a new
trial.
It appears that the appellee Gatewood was a resident of Frankfort, and went to Shelbyville on County Court day, November 3,
1911.
During the day he took several drinks of brandy, and while
there is some dispute as to the number of drinks he took during the
day, that question is not of importance. The real question is, was
he too much intoxicated to be taken on as a passenger when he
attempted to board the train in the evening, on his return to Frankfort.
He reached the depot some time before the train was due and
while waiting he fell asleep, and upon rising he staggered and went
to the train steps. In order to judge his condition when he went to
the train, much evidence was heard as to his conduct before going
to the depot, while there and after the train had left him. All tending to some degree to show his true condition and his state of intoxication. The lower court in instructing the jury as to the law
of the case as to when one should not be received as a passenger,
used this language, "Should be received unless he was so intoxicated
as to be offensive to other passengers on the train, or unable to care
for himself." In case L. & E. R. R. Co. vs. McNally, 31, Ky. L. R.
135 7 such an instruction was condemned, and in other cases various
views have been taken of this branch of the law, but in each case
the instructions were prepared to meet a particular state of facts,
not however like the facts found in this case.
With the facts before the court as above stated, the law de.
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fining the duties of the railroad company when a person offers himself as a passenger on its cars in this: If a passenger after he purchases a titcket for transportation, offers to enter the cars of the
train and is found to be in a sober condition, or not so intoxicated
as to effect his conduct, or render him offensive to other passengers on the train, or to render him unable to care for himself, they
should receive him as a passenger, otherwise the company had the
right to refuse him as a passenger.
In case of Andrew M. Sea, Jr., Admr. of Henry Conrad, deceased, vs. Eva Conrad, appealed from Jefferson Circuit Court, First
Division and decided October 1st, a question was raised as to the
disposition of the proceeds of a policy of insurance, amounting to
$5,000.00 on the life of Henry Conrad, deceased. The point decided is new, in so far as the Kentucky courts are concerned, and
is based upon the following facts.
Henry Conrad and Eva Conrad were husband and wife, and
he received the insurance policy on his own life for the benefit of
his wife, and matured the policy before his death. About fifteen
years before his death she sued and procured a divorce from him,
and under the provisions of section 425 of the Civil Code and section 2121 Kentucky Statutes, "Each was restored to all the property
not disposed of at the commencement of the action which either
party obtained directly or indirectly from or through the other during the marriage, in consideration or by reason thereof; and any
property so obtained without valuable consideration, was deemed
It does not
to have been obtained by reason of the marriage."
appear that the above language was put into and made a part of the
divorce judgment, but the court holds this immaterial, for the
reason that the code and statutes are explicit, and the provisions
could be enforced in a subsequent action if necessary. The last
premium on the policy was paid a few months before the decree of
divorcement, and the policy remained in the possession of Eva Conrad and no change was made on its face as to the benficiary, nor
was an application made for any such change. During the years
thereafter that Henry Conrad lived he collected the small annual
dividends that accumulated on the policy. Under these facts and
the law cited: Was Eva Conrad entitled to the proceeds of the
policy of insurance upon the death of Henry Conrad? While the
doctrine laid down in 46 Conn. Page 79, 28 Mo. 383, 63 Ohio 77,
and 94 U. S. 457 hold: "That where the policy of insurance is
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an 'Old Line' policy, in the absence of a provision in the contract

to the contrary, the designation of a beneficiary, valid in its inception
remains so, although the insurable interest or relationship of the

beneficiary had ceased." Our courts have never so held.
In view of the law found in the code and statutes as above set
out, the Court holds that the policy was property under the meaning
of the law, and as there was no valuable consideration to support
the claim of Eva Conrad the policy premiums having all been paid
by Henry Conrad, she had no calin that would prevent the operation of the restoration clause of the law regulating property rights
in divorce actions. The law of this case is reaffirmed in case
Guthrie's Executor vs. Guthrie, decided by this court on October 7.
In the case of Hietzman vs. Voiers, appealed from the Oldham
Circuit Court, many parts of the new primary election law passed
by the Legislature of 1912 have been construed. This case was
brought before the court, growing out of a contest for the office of
Assessor in the county of Oldham in August, 1913.
Without going into the facts of the case, which is unnecessary
in order to reach the correct construction of that primary act, and
which is plainly set out in the opinion delivered by the court, the
conclusions are here set out in their order as presented.
1. No voter is eligible to vote at a primary election of a political party, unless he is a riiember of such party.
2. In precincts where registration is required, registration of
the voter by which he declares his political affiliation is conclusive
of his right to vote as registered.
3. In precincts where there is no registration of voters, electors
are, by section 19 of the primary election law of 1912, allowed to
vote only the ballot of that party with which they declared their
party affiliations.
4. Where a voter 37 years old had voted indiscriminately for
Republicans and Democrats in general elections for twelve years,
and had voted in Democratic primaries for the same period; had
voted for a Democratic nominee for Governor in 1911, and for a
Republican nominee for President in 1912, it is held he was not
affiliated with the Democratic party, and was not qualified to vote
in a Democratic primary to nominate Democratic candidates in
1913.
5. Where a voter had not voted for eight years, but had voted
the Republican ticket when he last voted, and had shortly thereafter
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made up his mind in good faith, to thereafter vote the Democratic
ticket, and to change his politics and affiliite with the Democratic
primaries, although he had not voted at all in a general election.
during the time, such voter was affiliated with the Democratic party,
and was qualified to vote in a Democratic primary in 1913.
6. Neither the general election law nor the primary erection
law of 1912 makes it an offense for a qualified voter to vote id a
primary election of a party with which he is not affiliated .
7. Under section 36 of the primary law of 1912, which provides that primary elections under this act shall be conducted substantially as now provided by law in case of regular elections, and
that any omissions in said primary act of 1912 shall be supplied as
nearly as practicable from the statutes governing the November
elections. The Court of Appeals will, in case a contest results in a
tie vote between the candidates, direct them, under sub-section 11
of section 1596 of the Kentucky statutes, in case of appeal to this
court, to appear, either in person, or by properly accredited representative, before the clerk of this court who will then and there determine by lot which of the two shall be declared the nominee.
In the case of Vansant vs. McPherson, appealed from the Metcalf Circuit Court, parts of the new primary election law passed by
the Legislature of Kentucky, session 1912, are construed but based
upon the decisions construing the general election laws which have
been in effect for several years.
In this case three candidates were before the voters of th district composed of Metcalfe and Monroe counties, for the Republican nomination for the office for Representative in the Legislature.

The leading candidate received eight more votes than his next
nearest opponent and was awarded the certificate of nomination.
His opponent contested his nomination. Proper notices of contest
were served, and the whole case was regularly brought before the
proper tribunal for trial. It appears that in one precinct the leading
candidate, Vansant, received 65 Votes and the next candidate, McPherson, received 32 votes, Vansant leading over McPherson in
the wiole district by only 8 votes. To throw out this precinct altogether where Vansant received 65 and McPherson 32 votes,
would make McPherson the nominee.
McPherson sought to throw out this precinct on the following
grounds: That votes were cast after 4 o'clock, the time fixed by
law for the closing of the polls. It is shown that 10 votes were
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cast after four o'clock, and they were distributed among the three
candidates being votde for, so that the 10 votes so cast and counted
would make no difference in the result of the general count. The
question was, should the 10 votes be eliminated, or should the whole
precinct be thrown out on account of the irregulraity in allowing
the 10 illegal votes to be cast. The court declares, as in farmer
opinions, that the law fixing the time of opening and closing the
polls is mandatory; but that such a violation of this mandatory law
as amounts only to an irregularity will not be permitted to disfranchise the voters of a whole district, especially when it can be ascertained with reasonable accuracy, that the votes cast outside the
prescribed hours would not change the result. Any other rule
would disfranchise the voters of a whole precinct, for the mere error
of the election officers. If the illegally cast votes were sufficient in
number to effect the final result, then the whole precinct should be
thrown out, as decided in case of Banks vs. Sargent, 104 Ky. Reports.
It is seen that there were only 8 votes difference between the
two leading candidates, and to throw out the whole precinct would
nominate McPherson and to follow the law as declared in the case
of Banks vs. Sargent, the whole precinct would be thrown out. The
Court, however,. departs from the strictness of that opinion, upon
proof being offered so as to separate the votes cast after four o'clock
from those cast before, when that can be done with certainty.
It is then permissible to introduce those who voted after four o'clock
to show how they voted and strike such votes as cast from the final
count. The law prohibits the legal voter from testifying as to how
he cast his vote, but this is applicable only to legal votes cast by
legal voters. In this case the votes cast after four o'clock were the
votes of legal voters, but they were illegally cast, so that the proof
as above was for this reason allowed, and the result obtained which
did not change the count as made by the election commissioners..
Vansant was declared by them the nominee, the lower court hearing the contest and influenced by the law in- the case of Banks vs.
Sargeant, threw out the precinct, thereby declaring McPherson the.
nominee, but this court for the reasons above given, reversed the
lower court, and decided Vansant was the duly elected nominee.
In the case of J. H. Cook, County Clerk, vs. Bartlett, appealed
from the Anderson Circuit Court, the question was raised as to
whether or not women are allowed to vote in the election of County
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School Superintendent. The County Clerk of that county, having
failed to prepare a ballot to be used by the women in that election,
he was proceeded against by mandatory injunction requiring him to
provide such ballots.
Two acts were passed by the Legislature during the session of
1912, each bearing upon this question, and the court holds that
both being passed at the same session they must be considered together and treated as one act. The solution of the question, involved turns on the proper construction of these two acts, jind their
effect under the provision of the Constitution of this State. The two
acts, when considered plainly, provide for and make legal such a
vote, if it were not for the constitutional provisions which must be
treated in connection with them, and be made to show that. the constitutional provisions are not violated.
By section 145 of the Constitution, the qualification of voters
of the State is prescribed, and only male citizens possessing these
qualifications are entitled to vote. Sections 147 and 148 provide
for only one election each year and fixes the time of holding same.
Then follows section 155, which is in"
the following language: "The
provisions of sections 145 to 154, inclusive, shall not apply to the
elections of school trustees and other common school district elections. Said elections shall :be regulated by the General Assembly,
except as otherwise provided in the Constitution."
To determine whether or not the office of County School Superintendent is included in section 145, where it is expressed that only
male citizens can vote, or whether it is provided for under section
155, leaving the eligibility of the voter to the will -of the General
Assembly, depends upon the meaning of the words, Common
School District elections, in section 155. If the election of a County
School Superintendent is a common school district election it is
then not included in the restrictions of section 145, but is matter to
be handled by the General Assembly.
The Constitution designates by name a large number of offices
and fixes the qualifications of the holders of each, and no woman
could hold either, but the office of County School Superintendent
is not mentioned, neither as to who may hold the office or who
may vote for a candidate for that office.
Since the decision in case of Atchison vs. Lucas 83, Ky. 451,
it is conceded that woman could hold the office of County School
Superintendent or any other non-constitutional office.
As school trustees are by the name saved, in section 155, from
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the operation of the constitutional provisions, it is clear that the

persons who may hold such office or vote for any candidate for
such office and the qualifications of each must be determined by the
General Assembly. See 25 Ky. L. R. 18 and 135 Ky. 488. Since
the question of election of Trustees is clear under section 155, if it
means that this may be enlarged to include County School Superintendents it is necessary to construe the words: Common school
district elections to mean elections for Superintendent.
The court argues that the Legislature has, from time to time,
under the provisions of section 155, made radical changes in almost every administrative feature of the school laws. It has virtually abolished the school trustee, and created instead the County
School Board, and also granted a limited suffrage to women. klas
enlarged dstrict boundaries, and in fact has adopted every new
method that seemed to better our educational facilities. In view
of these facts it is decided that, in excepting school officers and
school election from the general provisions relating to elections, the
franers of the Constitution intended putting all common school
elections in a class to themselves, and this manifest intention should
not be frustrated by attaching undue importance to particular expressions, or by giving them a meaning that would defeat the intention of section 155 when considered as a whole. It is therefore
held that the office of County School Superintendent is contemplated in section 155, and as the General Assembly has provided by
enactment in 1912 that women may vote for such an officer, the
mandatory injunction compelling the County Clerk to provide the
ballots for women was sustained.

